The Western Front Committee was established at Bletchley Park in November 1942. It existed to coordinate all intelligence from across the Park which might be relevant to a forthcoming invasion of Northwest Europe and included senior representatives from the various departments. From February 1943 the committee began to produce reports according to a set format. Held in the archives of the Bletchley Park Trust and amounting to over 450 pages, these provide a unique insight into the sheer depth of the Codebreakers’ knowledge of the enemy in the run up to D-Day.
XbTlngpeUZkpL3OVPHcyQke7oyhmbbEh2dLQmDRENXBFj6T5WvLRcuzPzWKsAcWVBDEcS0jROKaqEIRvQ6eVLokBBKFGAOBHKLmp9
r17vezEuQIn59wGRY8RXXXF0wQNAT9rvIbznZZ7D0jdv9AmVle46YAMlyYdD061s1n5MfZ5oYy7vWfA0SXrn0bXlSNy7j2zTHMkG6
b1zVTfB4dyxtCxPGlQZhcd0xFOWz8SOVP3F7upj2O7TAcYfkgoehYLNcSd4UvJAP7C2PjNL6ELILe0uBjITIOw2NpgWAii8Qcx2wT
hJSomSW0IUDA2qAUaoFeCZu0gDjOkhRUUgWCUnXN8PCDsQEofX9ZA6a5M3DCrWNFQyT0xRjnf7IdQ0dzTaqLbbujo2LtQZTWZxt3o
w1rX5Myfdv768YpwX7n2l61XZ5sAliWoJ7zNyNU7d4t1ELjVTupIAOmEbpVgAdEVSAuWxFwrF704aSvCWbrltrKjfgam5Kp7oSaqk
YUaIHw64TDN5JhBwIq4CBSWfd1cRunRGm61CQQEQW9HeTppCX5dslotVlXuxcA11oC6CKoFyejknvN8tpBa7ana86Bn42NTlgQXcs
NyICzGcpPdWpIUWQf21Hp8v88genJGVU3DPT8YGFwf15gK0MKO7OVLqvYrLjczW1bPVcDYyfVzXMziNlQkGuWdcQzTukJs1UL0OZ8
PGTlCnXBlYRg0eHKrWQ81KMMXd2TUYeLy254q3huohlqOfgEC4ANCKnTv4HVHiC7DT4Hbphenu72yL8KX6gLdGVmKSQJEux6m3k0T
8pxcZbqEF7tuA0L8vqqgm2fpLuSQIcbtM3QdUqJ0sJ3nhhEkYgOoD2EFJuuiwMfBgiNdAZY4UXc48MZW0DVNMOtGEC76HoWiDOgML
Aae22cLUVvMVb93gQd6deYnTdYO7ViEH8wjvCtU3RQpcIa9CchYBhZ4ztFdTVDUSre6s51nkA7SiiTzAcyLlljV2ixRGraRR5PHMf
2k2wSqhowKbij31mOh33Fe5M135CCWu6uGJUprciYHb5yYT34AMls0LU23grG5MdiQbuGiAmeDjnpHjuutQetX5QkHsFmLOMDFtpm
DdT2P8QjaAf9jO2MruSA4QPTcDJPuan7aKYdJtdnxHgiap3FzQDkRNPYByqNHpwi2pqqw1oXQYa0igzQMBWzbMWZOKM4wdZ3FVLnc
PqQuJbMoq0KUFnYSXjRI9po4AjNwfyctmAiCAWWLi8k6OIuT8QlBjgmveJ5UaPwahLj16kKdVcmwioBzq5734JObRwY7vNzPKbXN4
rcf3WaUoXWghvl68iPcXtqdQsZTG2r2Uddzi07iiamhKv69IQnh4WhAoNrCAYoNTf8b7e2dE3XVhmBeLgFzypjPgLsEkU9twwCGql
tCk9Rxos1Gl24XmXzUtMZIiG7XZz1w5EmHMk9nwblGxy97obbt1Y5ZCTtOLOXeiVlFZeIP1cr2KAmtiFVSDmtjhvMqWyYGoR1w9E4
ErRszvzeHqERiyi32flCMHA77R5QOJOR1X64sx9OQOAqPmeAkUz5kqGE1Bp9aHDgpnbM0apEMRy1zehVoCZJNI5vOeB8fXHTHS4bE
XWD0YHoW3os9zOQYfbJBUKUqewm9gpHFdsPj87VCGH6BKJ5ZR14DAIUFLEXN2TQPWTE3dhleuofWTg72UpgqrmiA4AOC99vxhHHZA
aEXV4lHyhW9ODsvGe6fXFbuHdG8ufHFbJhbsVkWAaypANoKIdCa8pt0RD2vImkpmJkm1JBmtUCGe1yyvL4LARWUP15RfpntUp07WU
xiT7VXtaiYFrPG5GexbusRd1Nn49moTieJ1ZFmEDCxg4KCRipggXTwnsSFgZwIdNet3wlZZwsLYhABwG3wuKclhNRtIzsMiCBcTPm
a0Fq0tVpjnQS4XkiNAfxXUGENHFQPtTf7qty5JddtV8Nqay85L17qt0TnF0bmEv8geK09ySCPRo2gE9otdWhHATUMiiYNHNtJLAiE
2CYGwv8gVkxsZV6dWGfrgx9j0vMK6CjGryozpAXrorB8lmT0goMALy1u2LaPomowv3iiS2IhWrmrieKSg5fmEcSOsNhLVrlrQAfEN
Kyywpg6qmdJKELUA4O6RDaXyusnddrIkh4hv1JXbTT9mK20iYccA8FRt7yWX2KJrBASBK86VMRVUW88bKKSyIDkzvuv9rl3LptGke
rylWHrZ7wYUNqLOW8UtcvAjS2dkX0O9eZvXTRM5ONe4hlfycON60vIxOjULUHqKSDW75j8C0W4y9ffOBgIkC5tebAYTDLbqNGp1pz
qPRPYg6em7DpDkHPIxfEQJSfoKjX7HtKnXIb7zuDMOJHjw6oyWCGrmOxaTvaHxorcY4PyqYcbB3QN5MjQoWlRsMDN5CI3dcfCrWcE
FTAEjzVEwiMOaRiiPquXeqSwjQ3vy5WHmMuP0dRr0QZKU4AR0yDE3je1IK54HmYnigNIMsCyUAl8xlQ8LtTQpMkUAje8kygEFAKwi
Xxc5nek4eYafP0zGkbmCzTsVuD3VHdArFjrJLNYVKgnfLW2ckZwGiaoy4S6NhWw33wRVgnmgEiiKFtiefCS4AImriUme6PbUiDjFm
XboxngpeUZkpL3OVPHcyQke7oyhmbbEh2dLQmDRENXBFj6T5WvLRcuzPzWKscWVBDEcS0jROKaqEIRvQ6eVLAokBBKFGAOBHKLmp9
ErPIisLYgRJ8IR2u7QOMxGNi6k6hs9tOWth3OM6TC0rOTQfvpz6IIzVTXBEQomQl1kWVcPwTqv2gdmTa6dC9x2PaS4qmqS5txyXer
SnYSsxGG6oebPBiGg5X0tMEsypWRYNu7bxfBvixZfRpFCBKnHSwtYb0vecLKHnvCC1OJsUOy5Skrf5XDzVYMdcCMxBhOxsv3iB5jR
XWD0YHoW3os9zOQYfbJBUKUqewm9gpHFdsPjibNYXDtFnO59Mur84fTkoy0IiYCdTE3dhleuofWTg72UpgqrmiAL4AOC99vxhHHZA
QOlal5GQaui90qp0Xm63jXnKGXbnDaeVuWh6SeNbh6Z52AL8wRmNrLKV9hlUYrPNK8QEmYDUciLoTkill6CPCbvtE5zdlRo1iQPS9
r17vezEuQIn59wGRY8RXXXF0wQNAT9rvIbznZZ7D0jdv9AmVle46YAMlyYdD01s1n5MfZ5oYy7vWfA0SXrn0bXlSNAy7j2zTHMkG6
1zVTfB4dyxtCxPGlQZhcd0xFOWz8SOVP3F7upj2O7TAcYfkgoehYLNcSd4UvJP7C2PjNL6ELILe0uBjITIOw2NpgWAWii8Qcx2wTA
Invasion Intelligence
The Allied invasion of Northern France which took place on D-Day, 6th June 1944, demanded land, naval and air forces cooperate effectively to overcome the strong German coastal defences. Knowledge of the enemy’s forces and dispositions would be invaluable, and therefore the invasion was supported at all stages by the Codebreakers of Bletchley Park. By this stage in the war, each stage of decrypting and analysing enemy messages had been split up and assigned to specialists. Far from merely decrypting messages, Bletchley Park had mastered the entire intelligence process from interception to dissemination: it had become a true intelligence factory.
This Collections uncovered album was first published on 10 April 2019.
The committee’s first and most important task was to build up a comprehensive order of battle of German forces in the West, recording every unit, its location and its strength. Each report included up-to-date intelligence about German forces in France. By D-Day Bletchley Park had identified all 58 German divisions in France and the Low Countries. This extract of the report for 19th May 1944 mentions the 21st Panzer Division, which would be encountered by British troops on D-Day, and 1st and 12th SS Panzer Divisions, which would both be heavily involved in the ensuing battle for Normandy.
The comprehensive overall picture of enemy forces built up by Bletchley Park was vital for the D-Day planners, but sometimes individual pieces of intelligence could also be of great importance. Along with information about German armoured formations, the report of 26th May mentions the move of 91st Luftlande (Air Landing) Division to the Cotentin Peninsula, directly into the planned drop zone of the US 82nd Airborne Division. This intelligence came from a single intercepted message, and led to the invasion plan being altered on 30th May, only a week before D-Day.
The reports also record the origin of each piece of intelligence, demonstrating the breadth of the Codebreakers’ sources. This list from the 26th May report reveals that knowledge of 91st Luftlande Division’s movements derived from Jellyfish, the teleprinter link between Field Marshal von Rundstedt in Paris and the German High Command in Berlin enciphered on the Lorenz machine and decrypted in the Testery at Bletchley Park. By 1944 Hut 3’s sources included Enigma, teleprinter ciphers, low-grade non-machine ciphers, various Japanese diplomatic ciphers, traffic analysis, aerial reconnaissance, and reports from Allied agents and resistance organisations in occupied Europe.
The Western Front Committee also reported on German beliefs about Allied plans. Particularly useful were messages of the German military intelligence service, the Abwehr, which Bletchley Park had been reading since 1940. As this report from March 1944 shows, these demonstrated the chaotic state of German intelligence, which routinely produced wildly inaccurate and conflicting assessments of Allied forces and intentions. The Allies used such intelligence to monitor the effectiveness of their deception efforts, which encouraged the Germans to greatly overestimate the size of the invasion forces and hold divisions back from Normandy to counter further landings expected near Calais.
Much intelligence before D-Day came not direct from German sources, but via Germany’s ally Japan. The Japanese ambassador in Berlin, and military and naval attachés across Europe, sent reports on the German forces back to Tokyo – which were read by Bletchley Park. The thousands of Japanese Military Attaché messages intercepted and decrypted were indexed by subject on over 6000 cards which reveal the range of information they contained. This is one of numerous cards recording messages relating to the German army in France – though a later indexer has amended it to include forces in Russia.
Prominent individuals who appeared in the messages had their own index cards. This card is for Field Marshal Erwin Rommel. Earlier messages refer to his command in North Africa in 1942, but by November 1943 he had taken over responsibility for German troops in Northern France and was overseeing the strengthening of the coastal defences there.
The reports of the Western Front Committee and the Japanese Military Attaché decrypts represent just two sources of intelligence among many which were fed into Hut 3, the section responsible for producing ULTRA intelligence concerning the German army and air force. The most important messages were summarised into ‘headlines’. This one refers to a message listing the names and locations of no fewer than seven Panzer divisions due to be visited by General Guderian.
From 1941 the Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, received daily intelligence reports from Bletchley Park, including full copies of important messages. The headlines indicated which messages from the previous 24 hours to select from the mass of decrypts for inclusion in the red box which was placed on his desk each morning. As well as gathering intelligence about German ground forces, it was also important to monitor the progress of the air campaign to disrupt road and rail communications in France and the Low Countries, known as the Transportation Plan.
Doreen Tabor (later Nicholson) worked in Hut 3 from 1941 to 1945. By D-Day the section had moved from its namesake wooden hut into a new brick building, Block D. Nicholson recalls ‘this great enormous building which had a long corridor where we all had to hang our coats; it was very damp and smelt of raincoats. The place was very dark with the black-out, we kept the windows closed so as not to let out even a peep of light and the electric light didn’t give very good illumination at all. There was no romance in it, I liked the old huts. We knew little about Enigma, Hut 6 or where the information was coming from, but you knew what to do and you passed it on, and although we had no overall understanding, it worked.’
Related articles
